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pirical patterns of international capital flows: Financial capital flows from relatively
poor to relatively rich countries, while foreign direct investment flows in the oppo-
site direction; net capital flows go from poor to rich countries; despite its negative
net international investment positions, the United States receives a positive net
investment income.
International capital mobility affects output in each country directly through
the size of domestic investment and indirectly through the aggregate saving rate.
Under certain conditions, the indirect effect may dominate the direct effect so that
international capital mobility raises output in the poor country and globally, al-
though net capital flows are in the direction to the rich country. We also explore
the welfare and distributional effects of international capital flows and show that
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1 Introduction
Standard international macroeconomics predicts that capital flows from capital-rich coun-
tries, where the marginal product of capital (MPK, henceforth) is low, to capital-poor
countries, where the MPK is high. Furthermore, there should be no difference between
gross and net capital flows, as capital movements are unidirectional.
The patterns of international capital flows observed in the past 20 years, however,
stand in stark contrast to these predictions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007b,c).
First, since 1998, the average per-capita income of countries running current account
surpluses has been below that of the deficit countries, i.e., net capital flows have been
“uphill” from poor to rich countries (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006, 2007).
Second, many developing economies, including China, Malaysia, and South Africa, are
net importers of foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI) and net exporters of financial
capital at the same time, while developed countries such as France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States exhibit the opposite pattern (Ju and Wei, 2010). Third, despite
its negative net international investment position since 1986, the U.S. has been receiving
a positive net investment income until 2005 (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Hausmann and
Sturzenegger, 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille, 2007).
Recent research offers two main explanations to these empirical facts. Devereux and
Sutherland (2009) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) focus on the cross-country risk-
sharing investors can achieve by diversifying their portfolios globally. International port-
folio investment is determined by the cross-correlation patterns of aggregate shocks at
the country level. These models do not distinguish between FDI and portfolio equity
investment and, therefore, offer no explanation for the second pattern.
The other strand of literature focuses on domestic financial market imperfections
(Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2009; Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Smith and
Valderrama, 2008). Matsuyama (2004) shows that, in the presence of credit market im-
perfections, financial market globalization may lead to a steady-state equilibrium in which
fundamentally identical countries end up with different levels of per capita output, a re-
sult he calls “symmetry breaking”. Furthermore, financial capital flows from poor to rich
countries in the steady state. However, Matsuyama (2004) does not address FDI flows.
Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) analyze the joint determination of financial
capital flows and FDI in a heterogeneous-agent model with uninsurable idiosyncratic en-
dowment and investment risks. The precautionary savings motive plays the crucial role.
Ju and Wei (2010) show in a static model that, when both FDI and financial capital flows
are allowed, all financial capital leaves the country where credit market imperfections are
more severe, while FDI flows into this country. Thus, capital mobility allows investors to
fully bypass the underdeveloped financial system. The models mentioned above explain
only one or two of the three facts.
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While the literature does not explicitly address the implications of international capital
mobility for aggregate output, it seems intuitively plausible that, due to the declining
MPK, “uphill” capital flows make the poor countries and the world economy poorer.1 The
policy implications seem to be clear: The world would be better off without international
capital movements between rich and poor countries.
We extend the second strand of literature and explain simultaneously all three empiri-
cal facts. Following Matsuyama (2004), we take the tightness of the borrowing constraints
as a measure of a country’s level of financial development. The two countries in our model
differ fundamentally only in the level of financial development. Under international fi-
nancial autarky (hereafter, IFA), interest rates are affected by two factors. First, for a
given level of financial development, a lower capital-labor ratio implies a higher MPK and
higher interest rates. We call this the neoclassical effect, as it arises from the concavity of
the neoclassical production function with respect to the capital-labor ratio. Second, for a
given capital-labor ratio, a lower level of financial development implies the less efficient en-
forcement of credit contract and monitoring of borrowers. In this case, agents face tighter
borrowing constraints and the lower aggregate credit demand leads to a lower loan rate
and a higher equity rate. We call this the financial-underdevelopment effect. If aggregate
saving is interest-elastic, domestic financial frictions distort aggregate saving through the
interest rates, leading to the inefficiently low investment and high MPK. Thus, domes-
tic financial frictions affect interest rates directly through the financial-underdevelopment
effect and indirectly through the neoclassical effect. In the less financially developed coun-
try, the steady-state loan rate is lower, as the financial-underdevelopment effect dominates
the neoclassical effect; as the two effects work in the same direction, the steady-state eq-
uity rate is strictly higher.
Suppose that the two countries are initially in the steady state under IFA. Upon
full capital mobility, the more financially developed country receives net capital inflows,
thanks to its larger credit market. In other words, net capital flows are “uphill” from the
poor to the rich country. The initial cross-country interest rate differentials drive financial
capital flows from the poor to the rich country and FDI flows in the opposite direction.
Since the rich country receives a higher return on its FDI assets than it pays on its foreign
debts, it gets a positive net investment income despite its negative net international
investment position. Intuitively, by “exporting” its superior financial services through
two-way capital flows, the rich country receives a positive net reward, accordingly. Thus,
our model predictions are consistent with the three empirical facts mentioned above.
Building upon this model, we make four contributions to the literature.
First, we show that full capital mobility can raise output in the poor country as well
as globally, despite “uphill” net capital flows. Intuitively, financial frictions depress the
return on and, hence, the level of aggregate saving. Allowing for international capital mo-
1Matsuyama (2004) and von Hagen and Zhang (2010) show that this may indeed be the case.
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bility provides domestic households with better returns on savings. Thus, by ameliorating
the interest rate distortions, capital mobility indirectly raises aggregate savings in the less
financially developed country. If saving is sufficiently interest-elastic, the rise in aggregate
saving may exceeds net capital outflows so that aggregate investment and output in the
less financially developed country as well as globally can be higher than under IFA.
The interest-elastic saving is key to output gains in our model and deserves special
attention. Given the Cobb-Douglas preference, the income effect and the substitution
effect of interest rates on saving exactly offset each other. The interest-elastic saving in
our model results from the positive future labor income, which is defined as the human
wealth effect by Summers (1981). Our model predicts that, in the country with a higher
growth rate of the labor income, aggregate saving is more interest-elastic so that full
capital mobility is more likely to raise output. The interest elasticity of saving has been
the focus of the debates on the effectiveness of tax reform (Bernheim, 2002; Evans, 1983;
Summers, 1981), financial liberalization (Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan, and Schiantarelli,
2000), and other public policies (Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991) on capital accumula-
tion. The empirical evidences on the magnitude of the interest elasticity of savings are
rather mixed (Giovannini, 1983; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven, 2000). In partic-
ular, Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996) provide the empirical evidences that savings are
more responsive to rates of return at higher income levels. Instead of arguing for the
empirical significance of the interest elasticity of saving, our analysis complements the
existing literature by emphasizing the theoretical relevance of the interest-elastic saving
to the output implications of capital account liberalization policy.
As our second contribution, we show that financial capital flows affect the owners of
credit capital and equity capital in opposite ways and so do FDI flows. Capital flows also
affect the intergenerational income distribution. Our model points out such distributional
effects of capital flows and offers an explanation for why capital account liberalization often
encounters both support and opposition in a given country.
Third, we also analyze a scenario where one country is more financially developed and
in its steady state, while the other country is less financially developed and below its steady
state before capital account liberalization. We study the interactions of international
capital flows and the economic convergence of the second country and show that the
pattern of international capital flows may reverse along the convergence process of the
less financially developed country.
We assume that the mass of individuals who can produce is fixed in each country,
while the investment size of each producer is endogenously determined. Thus, aggregate
investment occurs on the intensive margin instead of on the extensive margin as in Mat-
suyama (2004). Countries with identical fundamentals have the same, unique, and stable
steady state under capital mobility in our model. As our fourth contribution, we show
that Matsuyama’s symmetry-breaking depends critically on the assumption of the fixed
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project size and thus, investment occurs along the extensive margin.
Our model differs from the existing literature in the following aspects. The static
model of Ju and Wei (2010) is useful for analyzing the immediate impacts of capital
account liberalization, while our OLG model facilitates the short-run and the long-run
analysis. Devereux and Sutherland (2009); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009);
Tille and van Wincoop (2010) capture international capital flows in the settings with ag-
gregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty, while our model features international capital flows
in the deterministic setting. Angeletos and Panousi (2011); Buera and Shin (2010); Car-
roll and Jeanne (2011); Sandri (2010); Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) address
“uphill” financial capital flows, while we focus on the joint determination of financial
capital and FDI flows. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Mendoza, Quadrini,
and Rios-Rull (2009) analyze the joint determination of financial capital and FDI flows
in an endowment-economy model, while endogenous capital accumulation is crucial in
our model. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) assume that foreign direct investors
from the more financially developed country have an advantage in capitalizing the return
on investment in the host country and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) assume
that investors from the more financially developed country can insure their foreign direct
investment using the better risk-sharing opportunities in their home country. We do not
need these extra assumptions. Carroll and Jeanne (2011); Sandri (2010) feature the pre-
cautionary savings channel in a model with idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets,
while interest-elastic savings in our model result from limited commitment.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) present alternative estimates of cross-country MPK differ-
ences to assess the importance of international credit market frictions. They implicitly
assume away domestic financial frictions so that the MPK is the rate of return to investors
and the driving force behind international capital flows. They find that, if one focuses
on reproducible capital and adjusts for the higher relative prices of capital goods in poor
countries, the MPK does not differ much between developed and developing countries.
Thus, they conclude that international credit market frictions cannot go far in explaining
observed capital flows between these countries. Our analysis abstracts from international
credit market frictions and focuses on domestic financial frictions which creates a wedge
between the private rates of return (i.e., the rates of return to credit capital and equity
capital) and the social rate of return (i.e., MPK). The private rates of return are the driv-
ing forces behind international capital flows in our model, which allows us to distinguish
between financial capital and FDI flows.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and shows
the distortions of financial frictions on interest rates and output under IFA. Section 3
analyzes the output and welfare implications of capital mobility. Section 4 concludes
with some remarks. Appendix collects the technical proofs and relevant discussions.
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2 The Model under International Financial Autarky
The world economy consists of two countries, N (North) and S (South), which are fun-
damentally identical except in the level of financial development as specified later. In
the following, variables in country i ∈ {N,S} are denoted with the superscript i. A final
good can be consumed or transformed into capital goods. The final good is internationally
tradable and chosen as the numeraire, while capital goods are non-tradable.
Individuals live for two periods, young and old. There is no population growth and the
size of each generation is normalized to one in each country. Each individual is endowed
with one unit of labor when young and  ≥ 0 units of labor when old, which are supplied
to aggregate production. Aggregate labor supply is L = 1 +  in each period.
At the beginning of each period, final goods Y it are produced with capital goods K
i
t
and labor L in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. Capital goods fully depreciate after production.
Capital goods and labor are priced at their respective marginal products. To summarize,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
L
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
RitK
i
t = αY
i
t and ω
i
tL = (1− α)Y it , (2)
where ωit denotes the wage rate and R
i
t denotes the MPK. There is no uncertainty in the
economy. In this section, we assume that international capital flows are not allowed.
Each generation consists of two types of individuals, entrepreneurs and households, of
mass η and 1−η, respectively. They have the Cobb-Douglas preference over consumption,
ui,jt =
(
ci,jy,t
1− β
)1−β (
ci,jo,t+1
β
)β
, (3)
where superscript j ∈ {e, h} denotes the identity of entrepreneur or household; ci,jy,t and
ci,jo,t+1 denote individual j’s consumption when young and when old; β ∈ (0, 1) is the
patience factor, i.e., a larger β means that individuals are more patient and care more
about consumption when old. If β = 1, they only consume when old, ui,jt = c
i,j
o,t+1.
An individual j born in period t and country i receives a labor income ωit, consumes
ci,jy,t, and saves s
i,j
t = ω
i
t−ci,hy,t at a gross interest rate of Ri,jt in period t. In period t+1, after
receiving the financial income Ri,jt s
i,j
t and a labor income ω
i
t+1, the individual consumes
its total wealth ci,jo,t+1 = R
i,j
t s
i,j
t + ω
i
t+1 and exits from the economy. Its lifetime budget
constraint is ci,jy,t +
ci,jo,t+1
Ri,jt
= Wi,jt , where W
i,j
t ≡ ωit + ω
i
t+1
Ri,jt
denotes its discounted lifetime
wealth when young. The component
ωit+1
Ri,jt
captures the human wealth defined by Summers
(1981). Given the Cobb-Douglas preference, its optimal consumption-saving choices are
ci,jy,t = (1− β)Wi,jt and ci,jo,t+1 = Ri,jt βWi,jt , (4)
si,jt = ω
i
t − ci,jy,t = βωit − (1− β)
ωit+1
Ri,jt
. (5)
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Plug the solutions to consumption back into the utility function (3), the individual’s
indirect lifetime utility function is ui,jt =W
i,j
t (R
i,j
t )
β.
Households and entrepreneurs may get different interest rates on their savings and the
determination of interest rates is key to our results. We assume that only entrepreneurs
can use final goods to produce capital one-to-one and the production takes one period.
Thus, the gross rate of return to the entrepreneurial investment made in period t is equal
to the MPK in period t + 1, Rit+1. With no other investment opportunity available,
households lend their entire savings to the credit market at the gross interest rate Ri,ht
in period t. As long as Rit+1 ≥ Ri,ht , an entrepreneur prefers to finance its investment iit
using loans di,ht . However, due to limited commitment, the entrepreneur can borrow only
up to a fraction of its future project revenues,
Ri,ht d
i,h
t = R
i,h
t (i
i
t − di,et ) ≤ θiRit+1iit. (6)
where di,et denotes the entrepreneur’s own funds in the project. In other words, an en-
trepreneurial project with the investment size iit demands for equity capital d
i,e
t and credit
capital di,ht . Following Matsuyama (2004, 2007), we use θ
i ∈ [0, 1] as a measure of finan-
cial development or the severity of credit market imperfections in country i. It captures
a wide range of institutional factors and is higher in countries with more sophisticated
financial and legal systems, better creditor protection, and more liquid asset market, etc.
Define the equity rate as the rate of return to the entrepreneurial equity capital,
Ri,et ≡
Rit+1i
i
t −Ri,ht di,ht
di,et
= Rit+1 + (R
i
t+1 −Ri,ht )(λit − 1) ≥ Ri,ht , (7)
where λit ≡ i
i
t
di,et
denotes the investment-equity ratio. For a unit of equity capital invested,
the entrepreneur can borrow (λit−1) units of loan in period t. In period t+1, it receives the
net return from the leveraged investment, (Rit+1−Ri,ht )(λit−1), in addition to the marginal
product of its equity capital, Rit+1. Iff R
i
t+1 > R
i,h
t , the entrepreneur borrows to the limit
defined by (6) to fully explore the leverage effect; after repaying the debt in period t+1, it
gets (1−θi)Rit+1iit and the equity rate is Ri,et = (1−θ
i)Rit+1i
i
t
di,et
=
(1−θi)Rit+1iit
iit−di,ht
=
(1−θi)Rit+1
1− θ
iRit+1
R
i,h
t
> Ri,ht .
If Ri,ht = R
i
t+1, the entrepreneur does not borrow to the limit; after repaying the debt in
period t+ 1, it gets Rit+1d
i,e
t and the equity rate is R
i,e
t = R
i
t+1. The non-negative leverage
effect ensures that the equity rate is no less than the loan rate and inequality (7) thus
marks the entrepreneur’s participation constraint.
In the follow, the social rate of return refers to the MPK, while the private rates of
return refer to the loan rate and the equity rate.
The markets for credit capital, equity capital, and the final goods clear simultaneously,
Si,ht = (1− η)si,ht = Di,ht = ηdi,ht , and Si,et = ηsi,et = Di,et = ηdi,et , (8)
Kit+1 = ηi
i
t = D
i,h
t +D
i,e
t , and C
i
t +K
i
t+1 = Y
i
t (9)
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where Si,ht and D
i,h
t denote the aggregate credit supply and demand, S
i,e
t and D
i,e
t denote
the aggregate equity supply and demand, and Cit ≡ η(ci,ey,t + ci,eo,t) + (1 − η)(ci,hy,t + ci,ho,t)
denotes aggregate consumption in country i and period t.
Definition 1. Given the level of financial development θi, a market equilibrium in coun-
try i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} under IFA is a set of allocations of households, {ci,hy,t, si,ht , ci,ho,t}, en-
trepreneurs, {iit, ci,ey,t, si,et , ci,eo,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, Rit, Ri,ht , Ri,et }, satisfy-
ing equations (1)-(2), (4)-(9),
2.1 The Model Solution
For notational convenience, we define some auxiliary parameters, ρ ≡ α
1−α , m ≡ (1−β)(1+)ρ ,
R ≡ (1+)ρ
β
(1 +m), θ¯ ≡ 1− η, Ai ≡ 1− θ¯−θi
1−η , B
i ≡ 1 + θ¯−θi
η
.
Given the Cobb-Douglas preference, the income effect and the substitution effect of
interest rates cancel out so that an individual saves a fraction (1−β) of its lifetime wealth
when young.  > 0 makes its lifetime wealth interest-elastic through the human wealth
effect. Thus, iff  > 0 and β < 1, its consumption when young is interest-elastic and
so is its saving. m captures the joint impacts of the human wealth effect ( > 0) and
impatience (β < 1) on the interest elasticity of saving. See Lemma 1 for the relationship
between m and the interest elasticity of saving.
θ¯ is a critical value. As shown below, for θi ≥ θ¯, the borrowing constraint is slack so
that the social and the private rates of return are equal to R in the steady state. For
θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the borrowing constraint is binding, Ai and Bi measure the wedge between
the private and the social rates of return with 0 < Ai < 1 < Bi and ∂A
i
∂θi
> 0 > ∂B
i
∂θi
.
The aggregate rewards to capital in period t + 1 is distributed to individuals as the
returns to their savings, (1− η)si,ht Ri,ht + ηsi,et Ri,et = Rit+1Kit+1, where Rit+1Kit+1 = ρLωit+1
according to equations (2). Use equation (5) to substitute away si,jt , we get
(1− η)Ri,ht + ηRi,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R, (10)
which is called as the reward splitting rule.
In the following, we first show the model solution in the case of the binding borrowing
constraints and then discuss the condition under which it is true.2 Let XIFA denote the
steady-state value of variable Xt under IFA. The model solution is,
Kit+1 =
βωit
m+ 1
[
1− m(1−A
i)(Bi − 1)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
]
, (11)
Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R
(
1 +
Bi − 1
m+ 1
)
, (12)
Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
R
(
1− 1−A
i
m+ 1
)
, (13)
2See the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix for technical derivations of the model solution.
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Rit+1 =
ωit+1
ωit
R
[
1 +
m(1−Ai)(Bi − 1)
(m+ 1)(m+AiBi)
]
, (14)
ψit ≡
Ri,ht
Rit+1
= ψiIFA = 1−
(1−Ai)Bi
m+Bi
, (15)
ωit+1 =
(
ΛiIFA
R
ωit
)α
, where Λit = Λ
i
IFA =
(m+AiBi)(m+ 1)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
, (16)
∂ ln ΛiIFA
∂θi
=
m(Bi − 1)
(m+AiBi)(m+Ai)
∂Ai
∂θi
− m(1−A
i)
(m+AiBi)(m+Bi)
∂Bi
∂θi
≥ 0. (17)
ψit denotes the relative loan rate and Λ
i
t denotes the aggregate efficiency indicator. Both
are time-invariant. As output is proportional to wage, Y it =
(1+)ωit
(1−α) , the model dynamics
are characterized by the dynamic equation of wages (16). Given α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a
unique and stable steady state with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
R
)ρ
.
Now, we show intuitively that θ¯ is the critical value for the borrowing constraints to
be binding. If θi = θ¯, Ai = Bi = 1 and thus, Ri,ht = R
i
t+1 =
ωit+1
ωit
R, so that the borrowing
constraints are weakly binding. In this case, the aggregate credit demand is strong enough
to push the loan rate equal to the social rate of return, ψi = 1; according to equation
(7), the zero spread implies that Ri,et = R
i
t+1 = R
i,h
t =
ωit+1
ωit
R = R1−αρα(1−α)(K
i
t
L
)−α(1−α).
Intuitively, in the country with a lower capital-labor ratio
Kit
L
, the growth rate
ωit+1
ωit
is
higher and so are the interest rates. We call this the neoclassical effect, as it arises from
the concavity of the neoclassical production function with respect to the capital-labor
ratio. For θi > θ¯, entrepreneurs do not have an incentive to borrow to the limit and
the equilibrium allocation is identical as in the case of θi = θ¯. In both cases, aggregate
savings
βωit
1+m
is transformed by entrepreneurs into capital so that the aggregate efficiency
indicator is ΛiIFA = 1. In the steady state, the wage is ω
i
IFA = R
−ρ, and the interest rates
are Ri,jIFA = R
i
IFA = R. Iff θ
i < θ¯, it holds that Ai < 1 < Bi. According to equations (13)
and (14), Ri,ht <
ωit+1
ωit
R < Rit+1 so that the borrowing constraints are strictly binding.
In subsection 2.2 and 2.3, we focus on the case of θi ∈ [0, θ¯) and analyze the distortions
of financial frictions in the presence of inelastic saving (m = 0) and elastic saving (m > 0),
respectively. The individuals’ saving rates are,
si,ht
ωit
= β
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
]
=
βAi
m+Ai
, and iff m > 0,
∂
si,ht
ωit
∂θi
> 0; (18)
si,et
ωit
= β
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
]
=
βBi
m+Bi
, and iff m > 0,
∂
si,et
ωit
∂θi
< 0. (19)
Define the aggregate saving rate as the ratio of aggregate saving Sit ≡ (1 − η)si,ht + ηsi,et
over aggregate labor income of young individuals in country i,
9
Sit
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
(
1− η
Ri,ht
+
η
Ri,et
)
=
β(m+AiBi)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
; iff m > 0,
∂
Sit
ωit
∂θi
> 0.
(20)
2.2 The Equilibrium with Inelastic Savings
m = 0 if individuals are fully patient (β = 1) or if there is no human wealth effect ( = 0).
According to equations (18)-(20), the individual’s and aggregate saving rates are constant
at
si,jt
ωit
=
Sit
ωit
= β. The binding borrowing constraints depress aggregate credit demand and
the loan rate falls below the social rate of return to clear the credit market. According
to equation (7), the positive spread makes the equity rate higher than the social rate of
return. Thus, financial frictions create a wedge between the private and the social rates
of return, ψit =
Ri,ht
Rit+1
= Ai < 1 <
Ri,et
Rit+1
= Bi. The smaller θi, the larger the interest rate
wedge. We call this the financial-underdevelopment effect and measure it by 1− ψit.
Being interest inelastic, aggregate saving is not affected by financial frictions. Thus,
aggregate investment is efficient Kit+1 =
βωit
m+1
and so is aggregate output, ΛiIFA = 1.
2.3 The Equilibrium with Elastic Savings
m > 0 if individuals are impatient (β < 1) or if there is the human wealth effect ( > 0).
According to equations (18)-(20), the saving rates are interest elastic. Besides distorting
the interest rates through the financial-underdevelopment effect, financial frictions also
distort aggregate saving, investment, and output.
According to equations (18)-(19), the distorted interest rates depress household saving
and raise entrepreneurial saving through the individuals’ human wealth channel. Accord-
ing to equation (20), a lower θi leads to a lower aggregate saving rate, implying that
inefficiently low household saving must dominate inefficiently high entrepreneurial saving.
What is the economic intuition behind that?
Let Ri,j ≡ ωit
ωit+1
Ri,jt denote the interest rate normalized by the the gross growth rate of
wage. Define an auxiliary function, M(x1, x2, p) ≡ (1− η)xp1 + ηxp2. The aggregate saving
rate is rewritten as
Sit
ωit
= β − (1− β)M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1), where M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1) captures
the aggregate human wealth effect.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country N is more financially developed,
0 < θS < θN < θ¯. As discussed above, the loan rate is higher but the equity rate is
lower in country N than in country S. According to the reward splitting rule (10), the
normalized interest rates are linearly related, (1− η)Ri,h + ηRi,e = R. Points S and N in
figure 1 represent the interest rates in the two countries, which are on the same reward
splitting line (the downward-sloping solid line). M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1) is shown by the convex
isoquant. According to the Jensen’s inequality theorem, the lower the isoquant, the larger
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Figure 1: Graphic Illustration of the Aggregate Human Wealth Effect
the aggregate human wealth effect and the lower the aggregate saving rate. Thus, financial
frictions reduce the aggregate saving rate through the interest rates channel. We call this
the elastic saving effect.
Let υi,jt ≡ ∂ ln s
i,j
t
∂ lnRi,jt
denote the interest elasticity of saving for individual j and Υit ≡
∂ lnSit
∂ lnRi,ht
denote the elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the loan rate under IFA.
Lemma 1. υi,ht =
m
Ai
and υi,et =
m
Bi
are linear in m. Iff θi < θ¯, Υit > 0 and rises in m.
In a country with a higher  or a lower β, m is larger and, according to equation
(5), individuals save less when young. Changes in the interest rates tend to have larger
impacts on aggregate savings. Thus, m is a key parameter affecting the interest elasticity
of saving and crucial for the aggregate implications of capital mobility in section 3.
Since aggregate investment is financed by domestic saving under IFA, financial frictions
distort aggregate investment and output. According to equation (17),
∂ΛiIFA
∂θi
> 0 and ΛiIFA
reaches its maximum of one, when the borrowing constraints are weakly binding at θi = θ¯.
According to equation (15), the same pattern exists for the relative loan rate, ψiIFA. Thus,
we can use ψiIFA to measure the distortions on the interest rates and output.
3
Proposition 1. For θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the borrowing constraint is binding and there is a unique
and stable steady state in country i with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
R
)ρ
.
There is a wedge between the private and social rates of return, Ri,ht < R
i
t+1 < R
i,e
t .
In the steady state, the loan rate rises and the equity rate falls in θi.
If β = 1 or  = 0, aggregate output is independent of θi. If β < 1 and  > 0, aggregate
output is below the efficient level and rises in θi.
3von Hagen and Zhang (2009, 2011) develop a model with heterogenous projects and show that
financial frictions distort aggregate investment among projects with different productivity and thus,
aggregate output is inefficiently low. Although output is distorted through different channels in the
current paper and in von Hagen and Zhang (2009, 2011), the implications of capital mobility are identical.
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3 International Capital Mobility
Under full capital mobility, individuals are allowed to lend and make direct investments
globally. Without loss of generality, we assume that the borrowing constraints are binding
in both countries under IFA and country N is more financially developed, 0 ≤ θS <
θN ≤ θ¯. We first solve the equilibrium allocation analytically and show that the steady-
state patterns of international capital flows under full capital mobility in our model are
consistent with the three empirical facts mentioned in the introduction.
Let Φit and Ω
i
t denote the aggregate outflows of financial capital and FDI from country
i in period t, respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows. Financial capital
outflows reduce the aggregate credit capital used for domestic investment, Di,ht = (1 −
η)si,ht − Φit, while FDI outflows reduce the aggregate equity capital used for domestic
investment, Di,et = ηs
i,e
t − Ωit. Therefore, FDI flows raise the aggregate credit demand in
the host country and reduce that in the parent country.4 With these changes, the analysis
in section 2 carries through for the cases of capital mobility, due to the (log-)linearity of
preferences, projects, and borrowing constraints. Financial capital flows equalize loan
rates and FDI flows equalize equity rates in the two countries. Credit and equity markets
clear in each country as well as globally. To summarize,
ΦSt + Φ
N
t = Ω
S
t + Ω
N
t = 0, R
S,h
t = R
N,h
t = R
∗,h
t , R
S,e
t = R
N,e
t = R
∗,e
t ,
Kit+1 = (1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et − (Φit + Ωit) = λit(ηsi,et − Ωit) .
The remaining conditions for market equilibrium in each country are same as under IFA.
At the world level, aggregate revenue of capital in period t+ 1 is distributed to house-
holds and entrepreneurs as the returns to their respective savings,
(1− η)R∗,ht
∑
i∈{N,S}
si,ht+1 + ηR
∗,e
t
∑
i∈{N,S}
si,et+1 =
∑
i∈{N,S}
Rit+1K
i
t+1 = ρ(1 + )
∑
i∈{N,S}
ωit+1.
Using equation (5) to substitute away si,jt , we get
(1− η)R∗,ht + ηR∗,et =
ωwt+1
ωwt
R, where ωwt ≡
ωSt + ω
N
t
2
. (21)
We call this the reward splitting rule at the world level.
Lemma 2. Under full capital mobility, there is a unique and stable steady state.
4In the case of debt default, the project liquidation value depends on the efficiency of the legal
institution, the law enforcement, and the asset market in the host country. Thus, we assume that
entrepreneurs making FDI borrow only from the host country and are subject to the borrowing constraints
there. Alternatively, we can assume that entrepreneurs may borrow only in their parent country no matter
where they invest, since the financial institutions in their parent country have better information on the
credit record, social network, and business activities of the entrepreneurs. The realistic case should be a
hybrid of these two. Our results hold under the two alternative assumptions.
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Let XFCM denote the steady-state value of variable X under full capital mobility.
Define a time-invariant auxiliary variable Z iFCM ≡
(ψiFCM−ψiIFA)m+B
i
m+1
(ψiFCM−ψiIFA)m+B
i
m+1
+Bi η
(1−η)
Ri,eIFA. The
solution to the equilibrium allocation is,
Ri,et =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(Ri,eIFA −Z iFCM), (22)
Ri,ht =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(
Ri,hIFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM
)
, (23)
ψit = ψ
i
FCM =
(1− θi)R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi, (24)
Φit = (1− η)βωit
[
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
R∗,ht
]
, (25)
Ωit = ηβω
i
t
[
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
]
, (26)
Ωit + Φ
i
t = βω
i
t
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
[
η
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
+ (1− η)R
∗,h
IFA
R∗,ht
]}
, (27)
ωit+1 =
(
1− θi
R∗,et
+
θi
R∗,ht
)ρ
. (28)
Under full capital mobility, the steady-state interest rates and capital flows are,
Ri,eFCM = R
i,e
IFA −Z iFCM , Ri,hFCM = Ri,hIFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM , (29)
ΦiFCM = (1− η)βωiFCM
(
1− R
i,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)
= ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,hFCM
, (30)
ΩiFCM = ηβω
i
FCM
(
1− R
i,e
IFA
R∗,eFCM
)
= −ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,eFCM
, (31)
ΦiFCM + Ω
i
FCM = ηβω
i
FCMZ iFCM
(R∗,eFCM −R∗,hFCM)
R∗,eFCMR
∗,h
FCM
. (32)
Proposition 2. In the steady state under full capital mobility, the world interest rates
are R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA) and R∗,eFCM ∈ (RN,hIFA, RS,hIFA), implying the partial convergence
in the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCM < ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA. Aggregate output is higher in
country N than in country S. The gross and net capital flows are ΦSFCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM ,
ΩSFCM < 0 < Ω
N
FCM , and Φ
S
FCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM + Ω
N
FCM . The gross international
investment return sums up to zero in each country, ΦiFCMR
∗,h
FCM + Ω
i
FCMR
∗,e
FCM = 0.
With a higher level of financial development, country N imports financial capital,
exports FDI, and receives net capital inflows. Since the rate of return on its foreign
asset (FDI outflow) exceeds the interest rate paid for its foreign liability (financial capital
inflow), R∗,eFCM > R
∗,h
FCM , country N receives the positive net international investment
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incomes, ΦNFCM(R
∗,h
FCM − 1) + ΩNFCM(R∗,eFCM − 1) = ΦNFCMR∗,hFCM + ΩNFCMR∗,eFCM − (ΦNFCM +
ΩNFCM) = −(ΦNFCM + ΩNFCM) > 0, despite its negative international investment positions,
ΦNFCM + Ω
N
FCM < 0. Thus, our model predictions are consistent with the three empirical
evidences mentioned in the introduction.
In the following, we use this analytical framework to address the aggregate implications
of capital mobility. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 focus on the output and welfare implications, if
both countries are initially in the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed
from period t = 0 on. Subsection 3.3 analyzes how the patterns of capital flows may change
or even reverse along its convergence path if country S is initially below its steady state
under IFA. Subsection 3.4 shows that Matsuyama’s symmetry-breaking property depends
critically on the fact that aggregate investment takes place in the extensive margin.
3.1 The Output Implications of Capital Mobility
Let us start with the case of inelastic saving (m = 0), which results from either  = 0 or
β = 1. Since the output implications of capital mobility are qualitatively identical in the
case of either  = 0 or β = 1, we focus on the case of  = 0 as follows. Individuals save
a fraction β of the labor income when young and financial frictions do not affect output
under IFA, Y iIFA =
1
1−αR
−ρ. Upon full capital mobility in period t = 0, aggregate saving
is same as under IFA, Si0 = βω
i
0 = βω
i
IFA, and net capital flows directly reallocate the
funds for investment from country S to country N, which has two consequences on output.
First, output in country S (N) is lower (higher) in period t = 1 than before; second, given
the concave aggregate production with respect to the capital-labor ratio at the country
level, world output is lower than under IFA, because net capital flows are in equilibrium
from country S where the MPK is higher to country N where the MPK is lower.
Corollary 1. In the case of inelastic saving, from period t = 1 on, world output is lower
than its steady-state value under IFA.
Under IFA, financial frictions do not production and steady-state output is same in the
two countries, even though the two countries differ in the level of financial development.
Capital mobility breaks the initial symmetry in the two countries in the sense that capital,
in the net term, flows “uphill” from the poor to the rich country in the new steady state,
leading to world output losses, which is also present in Matsuyama (2004). This is a typical
result of the theory of second best. In the presence of domestic financial frictions, capital
account liberalization causes capital to flow to the country with the higher interest rates
rather than to the country with the higher MPK. The output responses at the country
and the world level depends on the size of net capital flows, |Ωit + Φit|.
In the case of elastic saving (m > 0), besides the direct impact on output through
cross-country capital reallocation, full capital mobility also has an indirect impact on out-
put through aggregate saving. Take country S as an example. Financial capital outflows
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reduce the domestic credit supply and FDI inflows raise the domestic credit demand.
Both forces push up the loan rate and induces domestic households to save more. Net
capital outflows reduces the domestic credit supply and the rising competition from for-
eign entrepreneurs reduces the MPK. Both forces push down the equity rate and induce
domestic entrepreneurs to save less. The opposite applies for country N. Thus, changes
in the individual’s saving depends on the size of gross capital flows, |Ωit| + |Φit|. The
aggregate saving rate in country i is,
Sit
ωit
=
(1− η)si,ht + ηsi,ht
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
(
1− η
R∗,ht
+
η
R∗,et
)
. (33)
As shown in subsection 2.3, a higher level of financial development gives rise to a higher
aggregate saving rate under IFA,
SNIFA
ωNIFA
>
SSIFA
ωSIFA
. Under full capital mobility, the cross-
country equalization of the loan rate as well as the equity rate leads to the cross-country
equalization of the aggregate saving rate in the steady state, i.e., the aggregate saving
rate rises (declines) in country S (N),
SSIFA
ωSIFA
<
SSFCM
ωSFCM
=
SNFCM
ωNFCM
<
SNIFA
ωNIFA
. Thus, by raising
(reducing) aggregate saving and hence, the total funds available for domestic investment,
full capital mobility indirectly affect output in country S (N). Lemma 3 summarizes the
overall effect on steady-state output in the case of elastic saving m > 0.
Lemma 3. If η ∈ (0, 0.5), define κ ≡ 1−
√
1−4m2(1−η)η
2
< 1
2
and there are three scenarios:
1. if m ∈ (0, 1), Y SFCM > Y SIFA holds for θS ∈ (0, κ), and Y NFCM > Y NIFA holds for
θN ∈ (κ, θ¯);
2. if m ∈ (1, 1
2
√
η(1−η)), Y
S
FCM > Y
S
IFA holds for θ
S ∈ (0, κ) ∪ (1 − κ, θ¯), and Y NFCM >
Y NIFA holds for θ
N ∈ (κ, 1− κ);
3. if m > 1
2
√
η(1−η) , Y
S
FCM > Y
S
IFA always holds.
If η ∈ (0.5, 1), there are two scenarios:
1. if m ∈ (0, 1), Y SFCM > Y SIFA holds for θS ∈ (0, κ), and Y NFCM > Y NIFA holds for
θN ∈ (κ, θ¯);
2. if m > 1, Y SFCM > Y
S
IFA always holds.
Put it plainly, a larger m implies that aggregate saving is more interest-elastic. The
rise in domestic saving in country S is more likely to exceed net capital outflows so that
domestic investment is higher than under IFA and so is output.
Full capital mobility affects world output also through the direct and indirect channels.
First, “uphill” net capital flows directly lead to cross-country capital reallocation, which
widens the cross-country output gap. The direct effect on world output is negative,
depending on the size of net capital flows. Second, both financial capital and FDI flows
15
indirectly affect aggregate saving at the country level. Given θS < θN , the rise in aggregate
saving of country S dominates the decline in country N so that world saving rises and so
does world output. The indirect effect on world output is positive, depending on the size of
gross capital flows. Two-way capital flows imply that gross flows significantly exceed net
flows. Thus, it is possible that full capital mobility raises world output, despite “uphill”
net capital flows. Since the indirect effect essentially results from the elastic saving, the
size of the indirect effect naturally depends on the interest elasticity of aggregate saving.
According to Lemma 1, the higher m, the more elastic the aggregate saving, the larger
the indirect effect, the more likely full capital mobility raise world output.
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Figure 2: Comparing Steady-State Output under IFA and under Full Capital Mobility
For illustration purpose, we set up a numerical example and show that the world output
implications of capital mobility depend on m as well as the cross-country difference in
financial development. We set the population share of entrepreneurs at η = 10%, the share
of labor income in aggregate output, 1− α = 64%, and individuals put more weights on
consumption when young, 1− β = 0.6 > β = 0.4. We consider two alternative cases with
 ∈ {1, 0.2} and correspondingly, m ∈ {0.53, 0.18}.
The upper-left and upper-right panels of figure 2 show the steady-state output levels
in the two countries under full capital mobility versus under IFA, with θS ∈ [0, θ¯) on
the horizontal axes, given θN = θ¯. Given the parameter values, full capital mobility
strictly raises steady-state output in country N, while it raises steady-state output in
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country S if θS is below a threshold value θˆS, confirming our results in Lemma 3. The
bottom-left and bottom-right panels show the percentage changes of steady-state world
output under full capital mobility versus under IFA,
(
Y wFCM
Y wIFA
− 1
)
100. If m is sufficiently
high, e.g., m = 0.53 in our example, the output gains in country N always exceed the
output losses (if any) in country S so that world output is higher than under IFA; if m
is small, e.g., m = 0.18 in our example, there exists two threshold values θ˜S1 and θ˜
S
2 such
that, for θS ∈ (θ˜S1 , θ˜S2 ), full capital mobility reduces steady-state world output, while, for
θS ∈ (0, θ˜S1 ) ∪ (θ˜S2 , θ¯), it raises steady-state world output.
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Figure 3: Threshold Values under Three Scenarios of Capital Mobility
Given m ∈ (0, 0.53) and θN = θ¯, we compute θ˜S for world output under full capital
mobility as well as under the two alternative scenarios, i.e., free mobility of financial capital
under which individuals are allowed to lend abroad but entrepreneurs are not allowed to
make direct investments abroad, and free mobility of FDI under which entrepreneurs
are allowed to make direct investments abroad but individuals are not allowed to lend
abroad.5 Figure 3 shows these threshold values in the parameter space (θS,m), where
the solid curve denoted by θ˜SFCM , the dash curve denoted by θ˜
S
FCF , and the dash-dot line
denoted by θ˜SFDI refer to the threshold values under the scenarios of full capital mobility,
free mobility of financial capital, and free mobility of FDI, respectively. In each scenario,
capital mobility raises the steady-state world output if the parameters are in the region
above the respective curve. As mentioned above, the indirect effect, which contributes
positively to world output, depends crucially on elastic saving. Given θN and θS, a larger
 leads to a larger interest elasticity of savings, represented by a larger m. In this case,
5See the technical analysis of the two scenarios in appendix A and B, respectively.
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the output distortion of financial frictions under IFA is more severe. By ameliorating
the output distortion, capital mobility generates a stronger indirect effect through elastic
saving and world output is more likely to be higher than under IFA.
Let us first compare the scenarios of full capital mobility and free mobility of financial
capital. Under free mobility of financial capital, financial capital flows from country S
to country N. “Uphill” capital flows directly widen cross-country output gap, leading to
world output losses; by equalizing the loan rate across the border, financial capital flows
indirectly induce households in country S (N) to save more (less) and aggregate saving at
the world level is higher, leading to world output gains. The cross-country difference in θi
has to be sufficiently large so that the indirect effect can be strong enough to override the
direct effect. In our example, the parameters need to be in region A. Under full capital
mobility, two-way capital flows imply that gross flows are significantly larger than net
flows. Thus, even if the cross-country difference in θi is small, as in region B and C, the
indirect effect may still dominate the direct effect. Thus, full capital mobility dominates
free mobility of financial capital in generating world output gains.
Turning to free mobility of FDI alone, for parameters in region C, full capital mobility
raises world output, while free mobility of FDI reduces world output. However, for pa-
rameters in region E, the opposite applies. Thus, full capital mobility does not necessarily
dominate free mobility of FDI in generating world output gains. Consider parameters in
region C. Since the cross-country output gap under IFA is small in this case, free mobility
of FDI reverses the output gap through cross-country capital reallocation and the direct
effect on world output is negative. The indirect effect, which depends on gross capital
flows, is small here. Under full capital mobility, gross flows are significantly larger than
net flows so that the indirect effect easily dominates the direct effect and world output is
higher. Consider parameters in region E where two countries differ modestly in θi. Given
the relatively large initial cross-country output gap under IFA, free mobility of FDI di-
rectly narrows the cross-country output gap through cross-country capital reallocation,
implying a positive direct effect on world output. Thus, free mobility of FDI strictly raises
world output. In contrast, under full capital mobility, “uphill” net capital flows imply
that the direct effect is always negative and full capital mobility reduces world output.
Here, elastic saving is a critical channel through which full capital mobility may raise
output in the less financially developed country as well as globally. Shutting down either
financial capital or FDI flows may undermine such world output gains.
3.2 The Welfare Implications of Full Capital Mobility
As shown before, β and  are two key parameters affecting the interest elasticity of saving
and the output implications of capital mobility. We address here the welfare implications
of full capital mobility in the cases of inelastic and elastic saving, respectively.
Case I:  = 0 and β ≤ 1.
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With no labor endowment when old ( = 0), an individual’s lifetime wealth is simply
its labor income when young, Wi,jt = ω
i
t. If the individual is fully patient (β = 1), it
does not consume when young but saves its entire labor income. In this case, the lifetime
welfare only depends on its consumption when old, funded fully by its financial income,
ui,jt = c
i,j
o,t+1 = ω
i
tR
i,j
t . If it is impatient (β < 1), it consumes a fraction (1− β) of its labor
income when young and save the rest. In this case, its welfare depends on its consumption
in both periods of life and the financial income has smaller welfare impacts. In this sense,
impatience reduces the welfare impacts of interest rates, ui,jt = ω
i
t(R
i,j
t )
β.
As a sufficient condition for m = 0,  = 0 leads to interest-inelastic saving so that
capital mobility reduces (raises) output and wage in country S (N) and world output is
lower than under IFA. β = 1 or β < 1 does not change this result qualitatively. For
generation t = 0, given the predetermined labor income, ωi0 = ω
i
IFA, capital mobility
makes households better (worse) off and entrepreneurs worse (better) off in country S (N)
through the interest rate channel. For generation t → ∞, the declines (rises) in labor
income and the equity rate make entrepreneurs in country S (N) worse (better) off than
under IFA; as labor income and the loan rate move in the opposite direction, the welfare
implications to households are ambiguous. Intuitively, patience (a larger β) enhances the
welfare impacts of interest rates and the interest rate effect is more likely to dominate
the labor income effect. Using equation (28) to substituting away ωiFCM , we rewrite the
long-run household welfare as
ui,hFCM = ω
i
FCM(R
∗,h
FCM)
β =
[
(1− θi)R
∗,h
FCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi
]ρ
(R∗,hFCM)
β−ρ. (34)
The loan rate converges across the border and so does the equity rate, i.e., RS,hIFA <
R∗,hFCM < R
N,h
IFA, and
RS,hIFA
RS,eIFA
<
R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
<
RN,hIFA
RN,eIFA
. Thus, β ≥ ρ is a sufficient condition for
households in country S (N) to be better (worse) off in the long run than under IFA.
Figure 4 shows the percentage differences in welfare under full capital mobility ver-
sus under IFA in the case of  = 0 and β = 1. The dashed lines show the welfare
changes for generation t = 0,
(
ui,j0
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100, and the solid lines for generation t → ∞,(
ui,jFCM
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100. The upper (bottom) panels show the relevant variables in country S
(N) and the horizontal axes denote θS ∈ (0, θ¯). The parameter values are same as in the
numerical example in subsection 3.1, except β = 1 and  = 0. Changes in the welfare of
generation t = 0 (t → ∞) reflect the short-run (long-run) welfare implications. Figure 5
shows the welfare changes in the case of  = 0 and β = 0.4.
Given α = 0.36, if β = 1, β > ρ so that households in country S (N) are strictly better
(worse) off in the long run, as shown in figure 4; if β = 0.4, β < ρ so that households in
country S (N) may be worse (better) off in the long run, as shown in figure 5. The other
measures of individuals’ welfare have the qualitatively same responses in the two cases.
The social welfare of generation t is defined as the weighted sum of the welfare of
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Figure 4: Percentage Changes in the Short-Run and Long-Run Welfare:  = 0 and β = 1
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Figure 5: Percentage Changes in the Short-Run and Long-Run Welfare:  = 0 and β = 0.4
individuals born in period t, U it ≡ (1−η)ui,ht +ηui,et = ωitM(Ri,ht , Ri,et , β), whereM(x1, x2, p)
is the auxiliary function defined in subsection 2.3. Full capital mobility affects social
welfare through the labor income, ωit, and a composite of interest rates in the form of the
weighted average with the power β,M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β). Upon capital mobility, the responses
in labor income are unambiguous, while the responses in the composite of interest rates
depend on β, which is analyzed as follows.
Figure 6 shows the composite of interest rates in the space of (Ri,h, Ri,e). Point S (N)
denotes the interest rate combination in country S (N) in the steady state under IFA,
point A denotes that in period t = 0, and point L denotes that in period t→∞, i.e., in
the steady state under full capital mobility.6 According to equations (10) and (21), the
6Under full capital mobility, the loan rate converges across the border and so does the equity rate.
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Figure 6: Graphic Illustration of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) under Full Capital Mobility versus IFA
reward splitting rules in the steady state under IFA and under full capital mobility are
(1− η)Ri,hIFA + ηRi,eIFA = R = (1− η)R∗,hFCM + ηR∗,eFCM . Thus, point S, N, and L are on the
same isoquant (the thin solid straight line). As capital mobility reduces world output, the
world-average wage in period t = 1 falls. Given the reward-splitting rule (21) in period
t = 0, (1− η)R∗,h0 + ηR∗,e0 = ω
w
1
ωw0
R < R, point A is on an isoquant (the thick solid straight
line) below the previous one.
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) can be shown as the isoquant in the space of (R
i,h, Ri,e). Let us start
with the case of β = 1 where the isoquant ofM(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , 1) is a downward-sloping straight
line and coincides with the one representing the reward splitting rule. See the left panel
of figure 6. In period t = 0, M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , 1) =
ωw1
ωw0
R < R, while in the steady state under
IFA and under full capital mobility, M(Ri,hIFA, R
i,e
IFA, 1) =M(R
i,h
FCM , R
i,e
FCM , 1) = R. Thus,
the composite of interest rates declines in period t = 0 and converges back to its previous
level in the long run, which is purely driven by the world-average growth effect.
Let us then consider the case of β < 1 where the isoquant of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) is con-
vex and downward-sloping. The dashed curves and the solid curve in the middle panel
of figure 6 are the isoquants of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) in the steady state under IFA and un-
der full capital mobility. Due to the Jensen’s inequality theorem, M(RS,hIFA, R
S,e
IFA, β) <
M(Ri,hFCM , R
i,e
FCM , β) < M(R
N,h
IFA, R
N,e
IFA, β). The dashed curves and the solid curve in
the right panel of figure 6 show the isoquants of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) before and in period
t = 0, respectively. The world-average growth effect reduces M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β), while the
Jensen’s inequality effect reducesM(RS,hIFA, R
S,e
IFA, β). If β is sufficiently small, the Jensen’s
inequality effect dominates so that M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β) > M(R
S,h
IFA, R
S,e
IFA, β); if β is suffi-
ciently close to one, the world-average growth effect dominates so that M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β) <
M(RS,hIFA, R
S,e
IFA, β). Nevertheless, M(R
i,h
0 , R
i,e
0 , β) <M(R
N,h
IFA, R
N,e
IFA, β) always holds.
Now, we are ready to analyze the responses of social welfare. For generation t = 0,
given the predetermined labor income, ωi0 = ω
i
IFA, social welfare is driven purely by the
Thus, the interest rates in period t = 0 and in period t → ∞ must be in the region to the bottom-right
of point S and to the upper-left of point N.
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composite of interest ratesM(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β). Thus, the social welfare in country N declines
while the responses of social welfare in country S depends on β. For generation t → ∞,
since the changes in the labor income and the composite of interest rates are opposite,
the social welfare implications are ambiguous, depending on β.
Let us compare the social welfare responses in the cases of β = 0.4 versus β = 1 (the
third columns of figures 5 and 4). For a decline in β from 1 to 0.4, the short-run social
welfare responses in country S changes from negative to positive and so does the long-run
social welfare responses for θS close to zero. Thus, (im)patience is an important factor
affecting the welfare implications of capital mobility.
Case II:  > 0 and β < 1.
An individual’s lifetime welfare is
ui,jt =W
i,j
t (R
i,j
t )
β = ωit
[
1 + 
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,jt
]
(Ri,jt )
β. (35)
Compared with case I, allowing  > 0 introduces the human wealth component, 
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,jt
.
An increase in the relevant interest rate affects the individual’s welfare positively through
the financial income channel as mentioned in case I and negatively through the human
wealth channel. A larger  or a larger β amplifies the welfare impacts of interest rate.
Furthermore, a rise in the wage growth rate positively affect the individual’s welfare
through the human wealth channel and a larger  magnifies its welfare impacts.
As shown in subsection 3.1, allowing either a positive human wealth ( > 0) or impa-
tience (β < 1) does not change qualitatively the output implications of capital mobility
as saving is interest-inelastic; combining them makes savings interest-elastic so that full
capital mobility may generate output gains in country S and globally. Here, we focus on
the welfare implications in the case of output gain in country S, i.e., θS is small.
Take entrepreneurs in country S as an example. Upon full capital mobility in period t =
0, and the decline in the equity rate, RS,e0 < R
S,e
IFA, together with the positive wage growth,
ωS1
ωS0
> 1, raise the human wealth, partially offsetting its negative welfare effect through the
financial income channel. Compared with case I, the welfare decline of entrepreneurs is
much smaller. In period t→∞, the wage growth vanishes ωSt+1
ωSt
→ 1 and the decline in the
equity rate raises the human wealth, 
Ri,jFCM
, partially offsetting its negative welfare effect
through the financial income channel, (Ri,jFCM)
β. Furthermore, in the presence of long-run
output gains, ωSFCM > ω
S
IFA has a positive welfare effect. For a sufficiently small β, the
financial income effect can be dominated by the human wealth effect so that entrepreneurs
of generation t→∞ can be better off than under IFA, in contrast to case I.
Let us consider social welfare of generation t. Rewrite the social welfare as
U it = (1− η)ui,ht + ηui,et = ωit
[
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) + 
ωit+1
ωit
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β − 1)
]
. (36)
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Compared with case I, allowing  > 0 introduces the term 
ωit+1
ωit
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β − 1). Take
generation t → ∞ in country S as an example. As discussed in case I, if individuals are
impatient (β < 1), M(RS,hFCM , R
S,e
FCM , β) > M(R
S,h
IFA, R
S,e
IFA, β). We can use the Jensen’s
inequality theorem to prove that M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) and M(R
i,h
t , R
i,e
t , β − 1) move in the
opposite direction. Thus, M(RS,hFCM , R
S,e
FCM , β − 1) < M(RS,hIFA, RS,eIFA, β − 1). The wage
growth vanishes in the long run. The overall responses of the term in the square bracket
of equation (36) are ambiguous. Nevertheless, in the case of output gains, ωSFCM > ω
S
IFA,
the positive labor income effect may dominate so that the social welfare is higher.
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Figure 7: Percentage Changes in the Short-Run and Long-Run Welfare:  = 1 and β = 0.4
Figure 5 shows the welfare changes in the case of  = 1 and β = 0.4. Compared with
case I, the most distinctive welfare responses are the welfare gains of entrepreneurs and
the social welfare gains in the long run in country S, mainly due to output gains and the
positive labor income effect. This way, combining  > 0 and β < 1 creates the possibility
of output gains which can make almost everyone better off.
3.3 Full Capital Mobility and Economic Convergence
The analysis in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 is based on the assumption that both countries
are initially in the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed in period
t = 0. In this subsection, we assume that country N is initially in the steady state,
KN0 = K
N
IFA, but country S is below the steady state under IFA, K
S
0 < K
S
IFA. We address
the interactions between international capital flows and domestic capital accumulation
along the convergence path of country S. For simplicity, we assume that 0 < θS < θN = θ¯.
We focus on the case of elastic saving, i.e.,  > 0 and β < 1.
As shown in subsection 2.2, a lower capital-labor ratio KS0 < K
N
0 tends to keep the
interest rates higher in country S through the neoclassical effect; a lower level of financial
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development θS < θN tends to keep the loan rate lower and the equity rate higher in
country S through the financial-underdevelopment effect. As a result, the equity rate is
initially higher in country S so that FDI flows “downhill” in period t = 0. Depending
on the relative magnitude of the neoclassical effect and the financial-underdevelopment
effect, the loan rate in country S can be initially higher or lower than in country N so
that financial capital flows can be “downhill” or “uphill”, accordingly. In the following,
we consider these two effects on the loan rate and the patterns of capital flows.
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Figure 8: Patterns of Capital Flows and Economic Convergence
Let us start with the case of θS = 0.6. The dashed line, the dash-dot line, and the
solid line in the left panel of figure 8 show financial capital flows, FDI flows, and net
capital flows in period t = 0 as the functions of KS0 , respectively. The parameter values
are identical as in the numerical exercise in subsection 3.1, except that  = 0.
If KS0 is smaller than the first threshold value K
S
0 , the neoclassical effect dominates
the financial-underdevelopment effect so that the loan rate is initially higher in country S.
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Besides FDI inflows, country S also receives financial capital inflows in period t = 0, i.e.,
ΦS0 ,Ω
S
0 < 0. Thus, net capital flows are “Downhill” and gross flows are “One-way”. The
thick solid line and the dashed line in the right panel of figure 8 are the phase diagrams
of the capital-labor ratio under full capital mobility and under IFA, respectively; the
thin solid line is the 45 degree line. Net capital inflows speed up capital accumulation,
KS1,FCM−KS1,IFA = −(ΦS0 +ΩS0 ) > 0, so that country S converges faster to its steady state
than otherwise under IFA.
If KS0 is larger than the second threshold value K¯
S
0 , the neoclassical effect is signifi-
cantly dominated by the financial-underdevelopment effect so that the loan rate is much
lower in country S than in country N. Country S exports financial capital and imports
FDI in period t = 0, ΦS0 > 0 > Ω
S
0 . As financial capital outflows dominate FDI inflows,
country S has net capital outflows, ΦS0 + Ω
S
0 > 0. Thus, net capital flows are “Uphill”
and gross flows are “Two-way”. Net capital outflows slow down capital accumulation in
country S in the short run and the capital-labor ratio converges in the long run to the
level lower than under IFA.
If KS0 is between the two threshold values, the neoclassical effect is slightly dominated
by the financial-underdevelopment effect so that the loan rate is initially a bit lower
in country S. In period t = 0, country S exports financial capital and imports FDI,
ΦS0 > 0 > Ω
S
0 , while financial capital outflow is dominated by FDI inflow. Thus, net
capital flows are still “Downhill” but gross flows become “Two-way”. Net capital inflows
speed up capital accumulation and economic convergence in country S.
The dash-dotted line and the dashed line in figure 9 show the two threshold values as
the functions of θS in the space of (KS, θS). Due to inelastic saving, KSIFA is independent
of θS and shown as the vertical line at the right boundary. KSFCM increases in θ
S and is
shown as the upward-sloping solid curve. Given θS = 0.6 and the initial value of KS0 as
represented by point A, KSt rises over time along the flat path and sequentially crosses
the two threshold values. Financial capital flows and net capital flows change directions
when the capital-labor ratio moves from region D-O to D-T and U-T, respectively.
China’s patterns of capital flows in the last two decades are consistent with our model
predictions. The upper-left and the upper-right panels of figure 10 show China’s patterns
of international capital flows and investment positions in percentage of GDP in 1982-
2011.7 As is well known, Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 marked the beginning of
China’s dramatic economic opening represented by the policies encouraging FDI inflows
and exports. Since then, China has received annual FDI inflows over 3% of GDP on aver-
age, leading to a negative position of FDI around 21% GDP in 2009.8 Meanwhile, China’s
financial capital outflows are predominantly driven by official reserve accumulation, due
to its fixed exchange rate. In order to distinguish between private and public flows of
7See Appendix D for data sources and computation.
8Prasad and Wei (2007) provide extensive description on China’s FDI policy and data.
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Figure 9: Threshold Values under Full Capital Mobility
financial capital, the bottom-left panel of figure 10 shows China’s private foreign indirect
investment (FII) flows and the annual changes in foreign reserve (FR) in percentage of
GDP, while the bottom-right panel shows the positions of China’s private foreign indirect
investment (FII) and reserve assets (RA). Until the early 1990s, China received net inflows
of foreign indirect investment (including portfolio investment and bank lending), leading
to a negative position of FII around 9% of GDP. Since 1995, China witnessed outflows
of indirect investment, leading to a positive FII position in 1998. The net international
investment position turned from negative in 1990s to positive in 1998 and reached the
peak at 34% of GDP in 2007. China’s reversing patterns of capital flows over the past two
decades are consistent with our theoretical predictions along the flat convergence path in
figure 9.
So far, θS is assumed to be time invariant. Suppose that θS rises together with the
capital-labor ratio, i.e., country S converges along the upward-sloping path starting from
point A in figure 9.9 For sufficiently dramatic improvements in the level of financial
development, the entire convergence path has a high slope so that it stays in region D-O.
In this case, country S receives the continuous inflows of FDI and financial capital, which
speeds up the convergence process and leads to a higher steady-state capital-labor ratio
than in the case of the time-invariant θS. If the improvement in financial development is
9The convergence path does not have to be a straight line in the case of time-variant θS .
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Figure 10: China’s International Capital Flows and Investment Positions in 1982-2011
less dramatic, the slope of the convergence path is smaller so that it may still cross the
threshold values but later than in the case of time-invariant θS.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) show that Central and East European countries
(CEECs) ran on average current account deficits of over 5.5% of GDP, while Emerg-
ing Asian Economies (EAEs) ran on average a current account surplus of over 3% of GDP
in 1995-2004. Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009) obtain similar results. Figure 11 shows the
patterns of international capital flows and investment positions in 1994-2011 in percentage
of GDP for ten CEECs vs. seven EAEs.10 The ten CEECs as a whole have received finan-
cial capital and FDI inflows since 1997, expanding their negative international investment
positions; the seven EAEs as a whole witnessed financial capital and net capital outflow
after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, pushing their international investment positions
to the positive range. Comparing the patterns in CEECs and EAEs, we could raise a
hypothesis that
10The ten CEECs are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Slovenia, which are currently the member states of European Union, while the seven EAEs
are Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. We focus on CEECs’
post-transition period, i.e., 1994-2011. As the regional financial centers, Hong Kong and Singapore are
left out of our sample. Adding these two economies further strengthens our results. Data source: CEIC.
Variables are calculated in the same way as those for China. See appendix D for details.
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Figure 11: International Capital Flows and Investment Positions in 1994-2011
the levels of financial development in CEECs vs. EAEs are crucial for understanding
their opposite patterns of current accounts.
Now, we can analyze the welfare implications of full capital mobility for a developing
country along its convergence path to the steady state. Suppose that θS = 0.6 is time
invariant and country S starts from point A in figure 9. Under IFA, it would converge
horizontally to the steady state with the capital labor ratio at KSIFA. Under full capital
mobility, the inflows of financial capital and FDI reduce the interest rates in period t = 0.
Given uS,j0 = ω
S
0 (R
S,j
0 )
β and the predetermined ωS0 , the declines in the interest rates make
both households and entrepreneurs of generation t = 0 worse off. However, net capital
inflows speed up capital accumulation so that the labor income rises faster than under
IFA. Additionally, if the capital-labor ratio exceeds the first threshold value, financial
capital flows out of country S. Thus, the rises in labor income and the loan rate make
households of later generations better off. As country S always receives FDI inflows, the
decline in the equity rate dominates the rise in labor income so that entrepreneurs are
worse off in the short run and in the long run. The dashed curve, dash-dot curve and the
solid curve in figure 12 show the percentage differences in lifetime utility of households,
entrepreneurs, and social welfare of generation t = 0 under full capital mobility versus
under IFA, respectively. To sum up, full capital mobility has opposite welfare implications
to individuals in the intra- and intergenerational dimension; at the country level, there is
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Figure 12: Welfare Comparison under Full Capital Mobility versus under IFA
a tradeoff between faster economic convergence in the short run and a lower output level
in the long run.
As discussed in subsection 3.1, in the case of elastic saving ( > 0 and β < 1) and
a sufficiently low θS, full capital mobility raises steady-state output in country S. Thus,
the negative welfare implications due to lower steady-state output mentioned above are
weakened so that full capital mobility may bring both short-run and long-run benefits to
country S. Furthermore, if capital account liberalization is accompanied with the policies
raising the level of financial development as observed in CEECs, output in the developing
country can be higher both in the short run and in the long run.
3.4 Financial Integration and Symmetry Breaking
In a similar but simplified setting, i.e., β = 1 and  = 0, Matsuyama (2004) assumes
that the size of every production project is fixed at iit = 1, while the mass of individuals
in a country who become entrepreneurs, ηt, is endogenously determined. He shows that,
at a given world loan rate, free mobility of financial capital may lead to an equilibrium
with multiple steady states. In contrast, we assume that the mass of entrepreneurs in
a country is fixed at η, while the investment size of the entrepreneurial project iit is
endogenously determined. Since his model and ours differ essentially in this one aspect,
it is straightforward to illustrate Matsuyama’s result in the current framework.
Under free mobility of financial capital, the equilibrium conditions are almost identical
as under full capital mobility except that FDI flows are set at zero, ΩSt = Ω
N
t = 0, and the
equity rate is determined domestically rather than equalized across the border.11 Given
β = 1 and  = 0, individuals save their entire labor income, si,jt = ω
i
t. The borrowing
11See appendix A for detailed analysis of free mobility of financial capital.
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constraints, if binding, take the same form under financial integration in Matsuyama
(2004) and in our model,
R∗,ht (1−
ωit
iit
) = θiRit+1 = θ
i(ωit+1)
− 1
ρ . (37)
Lemma 4. Given the world loan rate R∗,ht , for ω
i
t ∈ [0, 1−θi], the phase diagram of wages
in Matsuyama (2004) described by R∗,ht (1− ωit) = θi(ωit+1)−
1
ρ is strictly convex, and ωit+1
increases monotonically in ωit with an intercept on the vertical axis at ω
i
t+1 =
(
θi
R∗,ht
)ρ
; for
ωit > 1− θi, the phase diagram of wages is flat with ωit+1 =
(
1
R∗,ht
)ρ
.
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Figure 13: Phase Diagrams of Wage in Matsuyama (2004) and Our Model
The solid line in the left panel of figure 13 shows the phase diagram of wages under
IFA in Matsuyama (2004), which gives rise to a unique and stable steady state at point A.
Given a fixed world loan rate R∗,ht = R
∗,h
IFA, the dash-dotted line shows the phase diagram
under free mobility of financial capital, which is convex for wages below a threshold value.
Since the slope of the phase diagram at point A is now larger than one, the initial steady
state at point A becomes unstable in the sense that any small perturbation at point A
moves the allocation permanently away from point A. There are two stable steady states
at points B and G. It implies that countries with the identical fundamentals (including
θ) and, thus, the same steady state under IFA may end up with different levels of income
under financial integration. Thus, Matsuyama (2004) claims that, in the presence of
financial frictions, financial globalization may result in symmetry breaking.
The mechanism behind the symmetry breaking is as follows. According to equation
(37), given the fixed size of project investment iit = 1, a marginal increase in ω
i
t (hence,
the entrepreneurial net worth) reduces the debt-investment ratio,
di,ht
iit
= 1− ωit
iit
= 1− ωit.
30
Given the fixed world loan rate, if the current wage ωit exceeds the level corresponding to
point A, the decline in the debt-investment ratio reduces the effective tightness of borrow-
ing constraint, which allows increasingly more individuals to produce as entrepreneurs.
Thus, even though all countries have the same level of financial development, the effective
tightness of the borrowing constraints in a country depends critically on its initial capital
stock in Matsuyama (2004), given the exogenously determined world interest rate. The
higher the current wage ωit, the easier to become entrepreneurs, the larger the expansion
of aggregate investment and, consequently, the larger the increase in aggregate output
and the wage in the next period. The opposite applies to the case where the current wage
is below the level corresponding to point A. This explains the convexity of the phase
diagram of wages in Matsuyama’s model.
Lemma 5. There is a unique and stable steady state under financial integration in our
model.
Given an exogenous world loan rate and a fixed mass of entrepreneurs, a marginal
increase in the current wage enables entrepreneurs to borrow and invest more in our model.
The negative effect of a marginal increase in the current wage ωit on the debt-investment
ratio,
di,ht
iit
= (1− ωit
iit
), is partially offset by the increase in iit, which is absent in Matsuyama
(2004). According to equation (37), the positive impact on ωit+1, is also smaller. The
higher the current wage, the smaller the investment expansion and, consequently, the
smaller the increase in aggregate output and the wage in the next period. This explains
the concavity of the phase diagram of wages and the uniqueness of the steady state in our
model. The solid line and the dash-dotted line in the right panel of figure 13 show the
respective phase diagrams of wages under IFA and under free mobility of financial capital
in our model, given a fixed world loan rate at R∗,ht = R
∗,h
IFA. In our model, wages converge
monotonically and globally to a unique and stable steady state (point A) under IFA and
under financial integration.
To sum up, given the fixed project size and borrowing constraints, aggregate invest-
ment responds to financial integration along the extensive margin in Matsuyama (2004),
which may generate symmetry breaking; given the fixed mass of entrepreneurs and borrow-
ing constraints, aggregate investment responds to financial integration along the intensive
margin in our model, which preserves the model’s stability property.
4 Conclusion
We develop a tractable, two-country, overlapping-generations model and show that cross-
country differences in financial development can explain three recent empirical facts of
international capital flows. International capital mobility may raise output at the country
and the global level even when the less financially developed countries experience net
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capital outflows. The reason is that international capital flows not only lead directly to
cross-country reallocation of aggregate saving but also trigger indirectly the adjustment
along the consumption-saving margin. Under certain conditions, the indirect effect may
override the prediction of conventional models in this literature, i.e., that net capital
outflows from less financially developed countries raise output in these countries and
globally. As it turns out, output gains are more likely, the larger are gross compared to
net capital flows and the larger the difference in the levels of financial development among
the countries under consideration. An obvious question then is whether the patterns of
international capital flows observed in recent years are indeed output improving. Our
model suggests two empirical indicators to consider. The first is the development of labor
productivity after a less financially developed country opens up to international capital
flows. Our model suggests that output gains come with the gains of labor productivity
and, hence, real wages in this country. The second is that output gains come with a
narrowing of the gap between the rate of return on equity and the rate of return on
financial assets (equity premium) in the less financially developed country.
We also show that capital account liberalization may offer a developing country the
short-run benefit of faster capital accumulation but possibly at the long-run cost of a lower
level of output. In order to reduce the cost and exploit the benefit, the developing country
should promote its level of financial development when liberalizing capital account.
We take the level of financial development as given and analyze how its differences
affect capital flows. For future research, we plan to address how economic growth and
various forms of capital flows reshape the level of financial development.
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Appendices
A Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Financial capital flows equalize the loan rate across the border and the credit markets clear in
each country and globally.
RS,ht = R
N,h
t = R
∗,h
t , (1− η)si,ht − Φit = (λit − 1)ηsi,et , ΦSt + ΦNt = 0.
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The remaining conditions for market equilibrium in each country are same as under IFA. The
solution to the equilibrium allocation is12
Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA, (38)
Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
ψit − θi
ψiIFA − θi
, (39)
Φit = (1− η)βωit
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
Ri,ht
)
= (1− η)βωit
ψit − ψiIFA
ψit − θi
, (40)
ωit+1 =
(
Λit
R
ωit
)α
, where Λit = Λ
i
IFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
, (41)
∂ ln Λit
∂ψit
= − θ
i
ψit(ψ
i
t − θi)
< 0 (42)
The relative loan rate ψit is key to understand the model mechanism. Since the loan rate is
initially lower in country S, RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, financial capital flows from country S to country N
in period t = 0, ΦS0 > 0 > Φ
N
0 , implying that ψ
S
0 > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
0 > ψ
N
IFA, according to equation
(40). Given ψSIFA < ψ
N
IFA, financial integration leads to the (partial) convergence of the relative
loan rate.
Let XFCF denote the steady-state value of variable X under free mobility of financial capital.
In the steady state,
ωit+1
ωit
= 1 and substitute it into the solution (38)-(41),
Ri,eFCF = R
i,e
IFA, R
i,h
FCF = R
i,h
IFA +R
i,h
IFA
ψiFCF − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
, (43)
ΦiFCF = (1− η)ωiFCF
ψiFCF − ψiIFA
ψiFCF − θi
, ωiFCF =
(
1− θi
Ri,eFCF
+
θi
Ri,hFCF
)ρ
. (44)
Proposition 3. In the steady state, the world loan rate is R∗,hFCF ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA), implying
that ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCF < ψ
N
FCF < ψ
N
IFA; the equity rate in each country is same as under IFA,
Ri,eFCF = R
i,e
IFA; financial capital flows from country S to country N, Φ
S
FCF > 0 > Φ
N
FCF .
If m > 0, the household saving rate responds positively to the changes in the relative
loan rate; if m = 0, the household saving rate is time invariant and same as under IFA. The
entrepreneurial saving rate is time invariant and same as under IFA.
si,ht
ωit
=
si,hIFA
ωiIFA
[
1 +
m
Ai
ψit − ψiIFA
ψit − θi
]
, and
si,et
ωit
=
si,eIFA
ωiIFA
(45)
B Free Mobility of FDI
The analysis for free mobility of FDI yields a mirror image of that for free mobility of financial
capital and the main results are summarized as follows.13
12See the proof of Lemma 5 for technical derivations.
13See von Hagen and Zhang (2010) for detailed proofs and analysis.
35
Under free mobility of FDI, there exists a unique and stable steady state. Let XFDI denote
the steady-state value of variable X under free mobility of FDI. The loan rate is Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
with the same steady-state value as under IFA, Ri,hFDI = R
i,h
IFA. FDI outflow from country i is
Ωit = ηβω
i
t
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
)
= −βηωit
(
ψit−ψiIFA
ψi
IFA−θi
)
. Given the initial equity rate differential,
RS,eIFA > R
N,e
IFA, FDI flows from country N to country S, Ω
N
t > 0 > Ω
S
t , implying the partial
convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
t < ψ
N
t < ψ
N
IFA. The equity rate responds
negatively to the changes in the relative loan rate, Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA −
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
[
ψit−ψiIFA
ψit−θi
]
.
The dynamic equation of wage is ωit+1 =
(
ωit
Λit
R
)
, with the aggregate efficiency indicator, Λit =
ΛiIFA
ψit
ψiIFA
, increasing in the relative loan rate. In the steady state, the world equity rate is
R∗,eFDI ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA), FDI flows from country N to country S, ΩNFDI > 0 > ΩSFDI , where
ΩiFDI = ηβω
i
FDI
(R∗,eFDI−Ri,eIFA)
R∗,eFDI
, and the wage rate is ωSFDI > ω
S
IFA and ω
N
FDI < ω
N
IFA.
The household saving rate is time invariant and same as under IFA. If m > 0, the en-
trepreneurial saving rate responds negatively to the changes in the relative loan rate; if m = 0,
the entrepreneurial saving rate is time invariant and same as under IFA.
si,ht
ωit
=
si,hIFA
ωiIFA
, and
si,et
ωit
=
si,eIFA
ωiIFA
[
1− m
Bi
ψit − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
]
. (46)
C Proof
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppress the country index for simplicity. According to
equation (5), υjt =
1
ωtR
j
t
ωt+1
β
(1−β)−1
. Using equations (12) and (13) to substitute away Rjt , we get
υht =
m
A and υ
e
t =
m
B which are linear in m.
According to the revenue splitting rule, (1 − η)Rht + ηRet = ωt+1ωt R. The aggregate saving
under IFA is rewritten as St = βωt − (1 − β)ωt+1
[
1−η
Rht
+ ηRet
]
. Let Υt ≡ ∂ lnSt∂ lnRht denote the
elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the loan rate.
Υt =
∂St
∂Rht
Rht
St
= (1− β)ωt+1(1− η)
[
1
(Rht )
2
− 1
(Ret )
2
]
Rht
St
(47)
=
(1− β)ωt+1(1− η)
βωt − (1− β)ωt+1
(
1−η
Rht
+ ηRet
) [ 1
Rht
− 1
Ret
Rht
Ret
]
. (48)
Use equations (12) and (13) to substitute away Rjt ,
Υt =
(1− β)(1− η)
(1 + )ρ− (1− β)
(
1−η
m+A +
η
m+B
) [ 1
m+A
− 1
m+B
m+A
m+B
]
(49)
=
m(1− η)
1−m
(
1−η
m+A +
η
m+B
) [(m+B)2 − (m+A)2
(m+A)(m+B)2
]
(50)
=
m(1− η)
(m+AB)(m+B)
(2m+B+A)(B−A). (51)
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Iff θ < θ¯, B > A and Υt > 0, implying that aggregate saving rises in the loan rate.
∂ ln Υ
∂m
=
1
m
− 1
m+B
− 1
m+AB
+
2
(2m+B+A)
(52)
=
AB2 −m2
m(m+AB)(m+B)
+
2
(2m+B+A)
(53)
=
(B−A)m2 +AB(2m2 + 4Bm+AB+B2)
m(m+AB)(m+B)(2m+B+A)
> 0. (54)
Thus, Υt is positively related to m.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding, Ri,ht < R
i
t+1, according to equation (7). We
prove that equations (11)-(17) are the model solution in this case.
At the aggregate level, θiRit+1K
i
t+1 and (1 − θi)Rit+1Kit+1 are paid to households and en-
trepreneurs as the rewards to their respective contributions in the form of credit capital Di,ht
and equity capital Di,et ,
Kit+1 = D
i,h
t +D
i,e
t =
θiRit+1K
i
t+1
Ri,ht
+
(1− θi)Rit+1Kit+1
Ri,et
⇒ θ
i
Ri,ht
+
(1− θi)
Ri,et
=
1
Rit+1
. (55)
We call it the investment sharing rule.
Aggregate capital stock consists of aggregate savings of households and entrepreneurs,
Kit+1 = (1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et = βωit − (1− β)ωit+1
(
η
Ri,et
+
1− η
Ri,ht
)
. (56)
According to equations (2), the aggregate reward to capital is Rit+1K
i
t+1 = ρ(1+)ω
i
t+1. Combine
it with equation (56), we get the aggregate capital reward rule
ρ(1 + )ωit+1
Rit+1
= βωit − (1− β)ωit+1
(
η
Ret
+
1− η
Rht
)
. (57)
Let rit+1 ≡
Rit+1
ωit+1
ωit
R
, ri,et ≡ R
i,e
t
ωit+1
ωit
R
, and ri,ht ≡ R
i,h
t
ωit+1
ωit
R
denote the social and the private interest rates
normalized by
ωit+1
ωit
R. The aggregate capital reward rule (57), the reward splitting rule (10),
and the investment sharing rule (55) are simplified as,
1
rit+1
= 1 +m−m
(
1− η
ri,ht
+
η
ri,et
)
1
rit+1
=
θ
ri,ht
+
1− θ
ri,et
1 = (1− η)ri,ht + ηri,et .
Given the parameters θ, η, and m, there exists a unique and time-invariant solution to the
normalized interest rates, ri,ht =
m+Ai
m+1 , r
i,e
t =
m+Bi
m+1 , and r
i
t+1 =
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
(m+1)(m+AiBi)
. Thus, equations
(12)-(14) are the solutions to interest rates. Using equation (14) to substitute away Rit+1 from
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the factor reward equation Kit+1 = ρ(1 + )
ωit+1
Rit+1
, we get the solution to aggregate capital stock
(11). Combining equations (1)-(2), the factor prices are
Y it+1 =
 αY
i
t+1
Rit+1
α

α (1−α)Y
i
t+1
ωit+1
1− α

1−α
=
Y it+1
(Rit+1)
α(ωit)
1−α ⇒ (Rit+1)α(ωit+1)1−α = 1. (58)
Using equation (14) to substitute away Rit+1, we get the dynamic equation of wages (16) with
the aggregate efficiency indicator Λi.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove that equation (22) is the solution to the
equity rate. Define ∆ψit ≡ ψit − ψiIFA. Given the binding borrowing constraints, use ψit = R
i,h
t
Rit+1
and ψiIFA =
Ri,hIFA
RiIFA
to rewrite the investment sharing rule (55) under IFA and under full capital
mobility,
ψit
1− θi −
Ri,ht
Ri,et
=
θi
1− θi =
ψiIFA
1− θi −
Ri,hIFA
Ri,eIFA
, ⇒ ∆ψ
i
t
1− θi =
Ri,ht
Ri,et
− R
i,h
IFA
Ri,eIFA
. (59)
Substituting Ri,ht and R
i,h
IFA with R
i,e
t and R
i,e
IFA using the reward splitting rules (21) and (10),
we solve the equity rate from equation (59). Plug the solution to the equity rate into the reward
splitting rule (21) to solve for Ri,ht . Using the approach in the proof of Lemma 5, we can prove
the solutions to financial capital and FDI flows (25) and (26).
Second, we prove that ψit is constant under full capital mobility. Suppose that ψ
i
t is time vari-
ant and so is Z it defined in section 3. According to equation (22), the international equalization
of the equity rate equalization implies that,
RS,eIFA −ZSt = RN,eIFA −ZNt , (60)
∆ψSt =
BS
BN
∆ψNt +
RBSη
1− η
(
1
RN,eIFA
− 1
RS,eIFA
)
. (61)
Using equations (22), (26), and (59), we rewrite the condition, ΩSt + Ω
N
t = 0, into
Ri,eIFA
Ri,et
=
(
1 +
Ri,eIFA
R
1− η
η
∆ψit
Bi
)
ωwt
ωwt+1
, ⇒ ωSt+1∆ψSt
m+BS
BS
+ ωNt+1∆ψ
N
t
m+BN
BN
= 0.
Given the international equalization of the loan rate, Ri,ht = R
∗,h
t , substitute away ω
i
t+1 using
equation (58) and the definition of the relative loan rate,
KSt +KNt = 0, where Kit ≡ (∆ψit + ψiIFA)ρ∆ψit
m+Bi
Bi
, (62)
∂Kit
∂∆ψit
= [(ρ+ 1)∆ψit + ψ
i
t](∆ψ
i
t + ψ
i
IFA)
ρ−1m+Bi
Bi
> 0. (63)
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According to equations (62)-(63), ∆ψSt is an implicit function of ∆ψ
N
t , which is downward
sloping and cross the origin point; according to equation (61), ∆ψSt is an implicit function of
∆ψNt , which is upward sloping and has an intercept on the vertical axis. Thus, there must exists
a unique and, hence, time-invariant, solution with ∆ψSt > 0 > ∆ψ
N
t .
Finally, we prove the existence of a unique and stable steady state under full capital mobility.
ψit is time-invariant and so is Z it . Let Ri,hFCM ≡ Ri,hIFA + η1−ηZ iFCM . It is same across countries,
Ri,hFCM = R
∗,h
FCM . Thus, according to equation (23), the loan rate depends on the dynamics of
the world-average wages. So is the wage in country i,
ωit+1 = (R
i
t+1)
−ρ = (
Ri,ht
ψit
)−ρ = (
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗,hIFA)
−ρ(ψit)
ρ.
Given the time-invariant relative loan rate, the dynamics of world-average wages are
ωwt+1 =
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
= (
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗,hIFA)
−ρ (ψ
S
FCM )
ρ + (ψNFCM )
ρ
2
,
ωwt+1 =
(
ωwt
R∗,hFCM
)α [
(ψSFCM )
ρ + (ψNFCM )
ρ
2
]1−α
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of the world-average wage is concave. Thus, there ex-
ists a unique and stable steady state. Proportional to wage, aggregate output in country i is
determined by the world output dynamics.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. According to equation (30), the world credit market clearing condition, ΦSFCM +Φ
N
FCM =
0 implies that
(
1− R
S,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)(
1− R
N,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)
< 0. Given RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, the world loan rate must
be R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA). By analogy, we can prove R∗,eFCM ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA).
According to equation (29), R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA) implies ZSFCM > 0 > ZNFCM , which then
implies that ψSFCM > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA. Use the same approach as in the proof of Lemma
5, we can prove the partial convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCM < ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA.
According to equations (30) and (31), the changes in the interest rates imply that ΦSFCM >
0 > ΦNFCM and Ω
S
FCM < 0 < Ω
N
FCM . Since R
∗,e
FCM > R
∗,h
FCM , the steady-state net capital flows
have the same sign as Z iFCM , according to equation (32). Thus, ZSFCM > 0 > ZNFCM implies
that ΦSFCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM + Ω
N
FCM .
According to equations (30) and (31), we get,
R∗,hFCMΦ
i
FCM +R
∗,e
FCMΩ
i
FCM = βηω
i
FCM (Z iFCM −Z iFCM ) = 0.
Proof of Corolarry 1
Proof. Let at ≡ ω
N
t +ω
S
t
2ωIFA
and bt ≡ ω
N
t −ωSt
2ωIFA
+
ΦSt +Ω
S
t
βωIFA
, where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... According to the
aggregate resource constraint in country S, net capital outflows cannot exceed aggregate saving,
0 < ΦSt + Ω
S
t < βω
S
t , we get bt ∈ (0, at). In period t ≥ 0, the aggregate investment in the two
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countries are ISt = βω
S
t −(ΦSt +ΩSt ) = (at−bt)βωSIFA and INt = βωNt +(ΦSt +ΩSt ) = (at+bt)βωNIFA,
respectively. Given α ∈ (0, 1), bt ∈ (0, at), and ωIFA =
(
β
ρ
)ρ
, the world-average wage is
reformulated into a condensed form,
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
=
(
1
ρ
)α [(ISt )α + (INt )α
2
]
⇔ at+1 = (at − bt)
α + (at + bt)
α
2
< (at)
α, (64)
where the last inequality sign results from the Jensen’s Inequality. The wage in period t = 0
is same in the two countries, ωS0 = ω
N
0 = ωIFA, and, thus, a0 = 1. From period 0 on, full
capital mobility is allowed. According to the inequality in equation (64), a1 < 1. For t =
1, 2, 3, ..., given bt ∈ (0, at), we have at+1 < (at)α and, thus, the time series of at is below 1,
or equivalently,
ωSt +ω
N
t
2 < ωIFA. Thus, the world output is smaller than before period t = 0,
Y St + Y
N
t =
ωSt +ω
N
t
1−α <
2ωIFA
1−α = Y
S
IFA + Y
N
IFA.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The factor price equation (58), the reward splitting rule, (10), and the investment sharing
rule (55) hold for the steady-state interest rates and wages under full capital mobility and under
IFA,
ωij =
(
Ri,hj
ψij
)−ρ
, ψij =
Ri,hj
Ri,ej
(1− θi) + θi, ηRi,ej + (1− η)Ri,hj = R. (65)
where j ∈ {IFA, FCM} refers to the scenarios of IFA and full capital mobility, respectively.
Under full capital mobility, the international loan rate equalization and the partial convergence
of the relative loan rate, ψSFCM < ψ
N
FCM , implies that ω
S
FCM < ω
N
FCM , or equivalently, Y
S
FCM <
Y NFCM .
Define ri,hj ≡
Ri,hj
R
and ri,ej ≡
Ri,ej
R
. According to equations (65), the steady-state wage under
IFA and under full capital mobility is a function of ri,ej ,
ωij =
1
Rρ
[
(1− θi)ri,hj
ri,ej
+ θi
]ρ
(ri,hj )
−ρ and ri,hj =
1− ηri,e
1− η . (66)
Given θi, if full capital mobility affects the equity rate in country i, the wage and hence output
in this country change accordingly. Define T ij ≡
∂ωij
∂ri,ej
as the first derivative of ωij with respect
to ri,ej ,
T ij ≡
∂ωij
∂ri,ej
=
ρωijN ij
[(1− θi)ri,hj + θiri,ej ]ri,ej ri,hj
, (67)
where, N ij ≡ θi
[
(1− ri,hj )2
η
+
1
1− η
]
− (ri,hj )2. (68)
Thus, T ij has the same sign as N ij .
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According to equations (12)-(13), ri,eIFA =
m+Bi
m+1 and r
i,h
IFA =
m+Ai
m+1 . Evaluate T ij in the
steady state under IFA by substituting ri,eIFA and r
i,h
IFA into equation (67)-(68),
T iIFA = ρωiIFA(1 +m)
(θ¯−θi)
1−η
[
θi(1−θi)
η(1−η) −m2
]
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
[
m+B
(
1− (θ¯−θi)1−η
)] , (69)
N iIFA =
[
θi(1− θi)
η(1− η) −m
2
]
(θ¯ − θi)
(1− η)
1
(1 +m)2
. (70)
We take the following approach to provide the sufficient conditions on the output implications
of full capital mobility. Consider country N. If θN can make NNIFA ≥ 0, full capital mobility
reduces the steady-state loan rate so that NNFCM > NNIFA ≥ 0. Thus, T NFCM > 0 and T NIFA ≥ 0.
As full capital mobility raises the steady-state equity rate for country N , we get ωNFCM > ω
N
IFA
or Y NFCM > Y
N
IFA. Consider country S. If θ
S can make N SIFA ≤ 0, full capital mobility raises
the steady-state loan rate so that N SFCM < N SIFA ≤ 0. Thus, T SFCM < 0 and T SIFA ≤ 0. As
full capital mobility reduces the steady-state equity rate for country S, we get ωSFCM > ω
S
IFA
or Y SFCM > Y
S
IFA.
It is trivial to prove the general results for θS = 0 and θN = θ¯. If θN = θ¯, NNIFA = 0 so that
full capital mobility raises its steady-state output, Y NFCM > Y
N
IFA. If θ
S = 0, N SIFA ≤ 0 so that
full capital mobility raises its steady-state output, Y SFCM > Y
S
IFA.
For θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the sign of T iIFA depends on that of N iIFA, or, that of
[
θi(1−θi)
η(1−η) −m2
]
.
Figure 14 shows all possible cases on the relative size of θ
i(1−θi)
η(1−η) and m
2 where the three
panels in the first row show the cases with η ∈ (0, 0.5), the two panels in the second row show
the cases with η ∈ (0, 5, 1), and the horizontal axis shows θi ∈ (0, θ¯).
Given η ∈ (0, 0.5), θi(1−θi)η(1−η) ∈ (0, 14η(1−η)) is a hump-shaped function of θi ∈ (0, θ¯). Point H
denotes its highest value 14η(1−η) > 1. Define κ ≡
1−
√
1−4m2(1−η)η
2 .
• If m ∈ (0, 1), there exists a threshold value θ˜1 = κ such that, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1), N iIFA < 0
and, for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ¯), the opposite applies.
• If m ∈ (1, 1
2
√
η(1−η)), there exists two threshold values θ˜1 = κ and θ˜2 = 1 − κ such that
for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ˜2), N iIFA > 0 and, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1) ∪ (θ˜2, θ¯), the opposite applies.
• If m > 1
2
√
η(1−η) , for θ
i ∈ (0, θ¯), it holds that N iIFA < 0.
Given η ∈ (0.5, 1), θi(1−θi)η(1−η) ∈ (0, 1) is a monotonically increasing function of θi ∈ (0, θ¯).
• If m ∈ (0, 1), there exists a threshold value θ˜1 = κ such that, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1), N iIFA > 0
and, for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ¯), the opposite applies.
• If m > 1, for θi ∈ (0, θ¯), N iIFA < 0.
Using the approach mentioned above, we can provide the sufficient conditions as summarized in
Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma ??
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Figure 14: Threshold Values under Various Scenarios
Proof. Use equation (28) to substitute away the wage in the steady state,
ui,hFCM = ω
i
FCM (R
i,h
FCM + ) =
[
(1− θi)R
∗,h
FCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi
]ρ
[(R∗,hFCM )
1−ρ + (R∗,hFCM )
−ρ]. (71)
Consider country S first. Compared with the scenario under IFA,
R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
>
R∗,hIFA
R∗,eIFA
. Thus, a
sufficient condition for uS,hFCM > u
S,h
IFA is [(R
∗,h
FCM )
1−ρ+ (R∗,hFCM )
−ρ] > [(RS,hIFA)
1−ρ+ (RS,hIFA)
−ρ],
or equivalently to prove the function Y = x1−ρ + x−ρ is an increasing function of x for x ∈
(RS,hIFA, R
S,h
FCM ). A sufficient condition for the latter is (1− ρ)x−ρ − ρx−ρ−1 > 0 or x(1−ρ)ρ > .
If
RS,hIFA(1−ρ)
ρ >  holds, Y is an increasing function of x for x ∈ (RS,hIFA, RS,hFCM ). Use equation
(13) to plug in the analytical solution of RS,hIFA =
θi
1−η (1 + )ρ, we get

1+ ≤ θ
i
1−η (1− ρ).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Take the world loan rate R∗,ht as given. For ωit ∈ (0, 1− θi] and iit = 1, take the first and
second derivatives of equation (37) with respect to ωit,
dωit+1
dωit
=
ρR∗,h
θi
(ωit+1)
1
α > 0, and,
dωit+1
d2ωit
=
ρR∗,h
θi
1
α
(ωit+1)
1
ρ
dωit+1
dωit
> 0. (72)
The phase diagram of wages is convex for ωit ∈ (0, 1 − θi]. By setting ωit = 0 in equation (37),
we get the vertical intercept of the phase diagram of wages at ωit+1 =
[
θi
R∗,ht
]ρ
. For ωit > 1− θi,
the marginal return on investment is equal to the world loan rate, Rit+1 = R
∗,h
t , and, thus,
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entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit. The phase diagram of wages ωit+1 = (R
i
t+1)
− 1
ρ =(
1
R∗,ht
)ρ
is flat and independent of ωit.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The proof consists of three parts. First, we show that the model solution is characterized
by equations (38)-(41). Under free mobility of financial capital, entrepreneurs invest their entire
savings as equity in their projects. Use equation (5) and the investment-equity ratio λit to rewrite
the aggregate domestic investment as
ηsi,et λ
i
t =
η[βωit − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
Ri,et
]
1− θiR
i
t+1
Ri,ht
= Kit+1 = (1 + )ρ
ωit+1
Rit+1
.
Multiplying both sides with
1− θ
iRit+1
R
i,h
t
ηβωit
and using the investment sharing rule (55), we get the
solution to the equity rate (38),
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
=
(1 + )ρ
β
ωit+1
ωit
1− θi
ηRi,et
, ⇒ Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R
m+B
m+ 1
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA.
Combining equations (38), (55), (12), (13) and using the definition of the relative loan rate, we
get the solution to the loan rate (39),
Ri,ht = R
i,e
t
(ψit − θi)
1− θi =
ωit+1
ωit
R
m+A
m+ 1
m+B
m+Ai
(ψit − θi)
1− θi
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA +
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
[
ψit − θi
ψiIFA − θi
− 1
]
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA +
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
[
ψit − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
]
.
In equilibrium, financial capital outflows are the excess domestic saving, Φit = (1−η)si,ht − (λit−
1)ηsi,et . Using equation (5), the investment-equity ratio, λ
i
t =
1
1−θi R
i
t+1
R
i,h
t
, and the definition of the
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relative loan rate, we get the solution to financial capital outflows, (40).
Φit = (1− η)βωit
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
]
− ηβωit
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
]
θi
ψit − θi
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
− η
1− η
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
]
θi
ψit − θi
}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
(1− β)
β
+
η
1− η
θi
ψit − θi
Ri,ht ω
i
t
ωit+1
− (1− β)
β
η
1− η
θi
(1− θi)
]}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
(1− β)
β
(
1− A
B
)
+
η
1− η
θi
1− θi
Ri,et ω
i
t
ωit+1
]}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
Rm(B−A)
(m+ 1)B
+
A
B
Ri,eIFA
]}
= (1− η)βωit
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
Ri,ht
)
.
Using the definition of the relative loan rate, the investment sharing rule, and equations (12),
(13), (38), we get the solution to the social rate of return,
Rit+1 =
Ri,ht
ψit
= Ri,et
1− θi
ψit
1− θi =
ωit+1
ωit
RiIFA
1− θi
ψit
1− θi
ψiIFA
.
Substitute away Rit+1 in equation (58), we get the dynamic equation of wages (41),
ωit+1 =
(
ωit+1
Rit+1
)α
=
 ωit
RiIFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
α = (ωitΛit
R
)α
, with Λit = Λ
i
IFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
.
Second, prove the uniqueness and stability of the model economy. Given R∗,ht , we use
equations (39), (41), (58) to rewrite the dynamic equation of wages as,
ln
(
ωit
ωit+1
R∗,ht
ψiIFA − θi
Ri,hIFA
+ θi
)
= lnψit = lnR
∗,h
t − lnRit+1 = lnR∗,ht +
1
ρ
lnωit+1 (73)
⇒ lnωit+1 = −ρ lnR∗,ht + ρ ln
(
ωit
ωit+1
R∗,ht
ψiIFA − θi
Ri,hIFA
+ θi
)
. (74)
Let W i ≡ ∂ lnω
i
t+1
∂ lnωit
. The first and the second derivatives of ωit+1 with respect to ω
i
t are
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
ωit+1
ωit
ρ
ρ+
ψit+1
ψit+1−θi
, ⇒ W i ≡ ∂ lnω
i
t+1
∂ lnωit
=
ρ
ρ+
ψit+1
ψit+1−θi
∈ (0, 1),
∂2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2
= −(1−W i)(W i)2 ω
i
t+1
(ωit)
2
(1 + ρ)
ρ
Since W i ∈ (0, 1), we get ∂
2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2 < 0. Thus, the phase diagram of wages is a concave function
under free mobility of financial capital if the borrowing constraints are binding.
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According to equation (74), for ωit = 0, the phase diagram has a positive intercept on the
vertical axis at ωit+1 = (R
∗,h
t )
−ρ(θi)ρ. Define a threshold value ω¯it = R
i,e
IFA(R
∗,h
t )
− 1
1−α . For
ωit ∈ (0, ω¯it), the phase diagram of wages is monotonically increasing and concave. For ωit > ω¯it,
aggregate saving and investment are so high that the relative loan rate is equal to one, or
equivalently, Rit+1 = R
∗,h
t . Thus, the borrowing constraints are slack and the phase diagram is
flat with ωit+1 = ω¯
i
t+1 = (R
∗,h
t )
−ρ. Given R∗,ht < R < R
i,e
IFA, we get ω¯
i
t+1 < ω¯
i
t. In other words,
the kink point is below the 45 degree line.
Thus, the phase diagram of wages crosses the 45 degree line once and only once from the
left, and the intersection is in its concave part. Thus, the model economy has a unique and
stable steady state under free mobility of financial capital.
Finally, we prove the (partial) convergence of the relative loan rate. As the loan rate is
initially lower in country S, RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, financial capital flows from country S to N, Φ
S
t >
0 > ΦNt , implying that ψ
S
t > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
t > ψ
N
IFA, according to equation (40). In the steady
state, given the world loan rate R∗,hFCF , the relative loan rate under financial integration is,
R∗,hFCF = R
i,h
IFA
ψiFCF − θi
ψiIFA − θi
= Ri,eIFA
ψiFCF − θi
1− θi = R
m+Bi
m+ 1
ψiFCF − θi
ηBi
, (75)
⇒ ψiFCF =
R∗,hFCF
R
ηBi
m+ 1
m+Bi
+ θi (76)
In order to prove ψSFCF < ψ
N
FCF , we just need to prove that
R∗,hFCF
R
η(m+ 1)
(
BS
m+BS
− B
N
m+BN
)
< θN − θS (77)
⇐ R
∗,h
FCF
R
η(m+ 1)
m(BS −BN )
(m+BS)(m+BN )
< θN − θS , (78)
⇐ R
∗,h
FCF
R
(m+ 1)m
(m+BS)(m+BN )
< 1, (79)
⇐ R∗,hFCFm < RN,hIFA(m+BS). (80)
Since 0 < R∗,hFCF < R
N,h
IFA and 0 ≤ m < m+BS , the inequality (80) must hold. Thus, we prove
the partial convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCF < ψ
N
FCF < ψ
N
IFA.
D Data Description
Data source for China’s patterns of capital flows: the annual data of financial account in the
Balance of Payments from IMF International Financial Statistics.
The flows of direct investment is computed as the sum of the entries under direct invest-
ment abroad and direct investment in reporting economy.14 The flows of indirect investment is
computed as the sum of the entries under portfolio investment assets and liabilities, under net
14In practice, direct investment abroad is recorded as a negative value while direct investment in
reporting economy is recorded as a positive value. Thus, if the sum of these two entries is positive, there
is a net FDI inflow into the reporting economy.
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financial derivatives, and under other investment assets and liabilities. China’s foreign reserves
are directly from the data series. China’s net capital flows are the sum of these three compo-
nents. We divide the four time series by China’s nominal GDP in terms of USD. In practice, a
positive value of capital flows in the balance of payments represents capital inflows while a pos-
itive value of capital flows in our model is defined as capital outflows. In order to be consistent
with our model definition, the signs of the four time series computed above are reversed. In the
bottom-left panel of figure 10, the solid line (FII) shows the flows of foreign indirect investment
and the dashed line (FR) shows the changes in foreign reserves. In the upper-left panel, the
dash-dotted line (FDI) shows FDI flows, the dashed line (FCF) shows financial capital flows as
the sum of FII and FR, the solid line (NCF) shows net capital flows.
Data source for China’s international investment positions: the annual data in 1982-2003
are from the data base of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) and the annual data in 2004-2011 are
from China State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
The net position of direct investment abroad is computed as the difference between direct
investment abroad and direct investment in reporting economy. China’s net position of indirect
investment abroad is computed as the sum of the net portfolio investment abroad, net financial
derivatives, and net other investment assets. China’s reserve assets are directly from the data
series. China’s net international investment position is the sum of these three components. We
divide the four series by China’s nominal GDP in terms of USD. In the bottom-right panel of
figure 10, the solid line (FII) shows the position of foreign indirect investment and the dashed
line (RA) shows the position of reserve assets. In the upper-left panel, the dash-dotted line
(FDI) shows the position of FDI, the dashed line (FC) shows the position of foreign financial
capital as the sum of FII and RA, the solid line (NFA) shows net foreign asset position.
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